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Taylor v. State:
SENTENCING
RESTRICTIONS
FOR
REPEAT OFFENDERS
UNDER
ARTICLE 27, § 643
ARE MANDATORY
ONLY FOR
TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS.
In Taylor v. State, 333 Md.
229, 634 A.2d 1322 (1993), the
Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that under Maryland's three time
recidivist statute, sentencing re-
strictions on suspension and eligi-
bility for parole are only mandated
for the first twenty-five years of
the offender's sentence. Accord-
ingly, under Article 27, § 643B of
the Annotated Code of Maryland,
the court granted trial courts the
broad discretion to suspend sen-
tences and grant parole after the
required twenty-five years of im-
prisonment. In so holding, the
court explicitly overruled the deci-
sion of the Court of Special Ap-
peals in Leggett v. State, 79 Md.
App. 170, 556 A.2d 289, cert.
denied, Leggett-El v. State, 317
Md. 70, 562 A.2d 718 (1989).
In the Circuit Court for Balti-
more County, a jury convicted
Donald Wayne Taylor of first de-
gree murder, five counts of forg-
ery, and five counts of theft.
Taylor's criminal history revealed
that he was a habitual offender
who had prior convictions for as-
sault with intent to rob and robbery
with a deadly weapon. Due to
Taylor's prior convictions, the State
filed notice of its intent to seek the
enhanced punishment of life im-
prisonment without the possibility
of parole for the first degree mur-
der conviction, under Article 27, §
643B of the Annotated Code of
Maryland ("§ 643B").
The trial court sentenced Tay-
lor to life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole for the
murder conviction, five years for
each of the forgeries, and one year
for each theft, to be served concur-
rently. Taylorappealedtothe Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland
which affirmed his convictions and
sentences. The Court of Appeals
of Maryland granted certiorari.
Before beginning its analysis,
the court reviewed the language of
§ 643B(c) and the trial court's
interpretation of that section in
imposing sentence on Taylor. The
relevant language of the section
provides that upon the third con-
viction for certain crimes of vio-
lence, including murder, the of-
fender shall be sentenced "to im-
prisonment for the term allowed by
law, but, in any event, not less than
twenty-five years." Taylor, 333
Md. at 232, 634 A.2dat 1323,n. 1.
Furthermore, under § 643B
"[n]either the sentence nor any part
of it may be suspended, and the
person shall not be eligible for pa-
role," except as provided by other
statutory sections. Id.
In sentencing Taylor under §
643B, the trial court had relied
uponLeggettv. State, 79 Md. App.
170, 556 A.2d 289, cert. denied,
Leggett-El v. State, 317 Md. 70,
562 A.2d 718 (1989), a court of
special appeals decision factually
similar to Taylor, and thus, the
trial court had not used discretion
in imposing the sentence of life
imprisonment without the possi-
bility of parole. Taylor, 333 Md.
at 233, 634 A.2d at 1323-34. Like
Taylor, the defendant in Leggett
had been convicted of first degree
murder and sentenced to life im-
prisonment without the possibility
of parole. Id., at 233, 634 A.2d at
1324. On appeal, Leggett argued
that the trial court erred by failing
to use its discretion in imposing the
sentence under § 643B(c). Id. Nev-
ertheless, the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland held that the
trial court, under the clear lan-
guage of§ 643B, had no discretion
to impose any sentence other than
life imprisonment without the pos-
sibility of parole with no part of
that sentence suspended. Id. at
233-34, 634 A.2d at 1324.
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The court began its analysis by
reviewing the statutory sentencing
requirements for first degree mur-
der. The court recognized that
unless a death sentence is sought,
first degree murder carries a sen-
tence of life imprisonment which
may be imposed in the trial court's
discretion with or without parole
and with all or part of that sentence
suspended. Id. at 234, 634 A.2d at
1324. Next, the court analyzed
whether this discretion was limited
by § 6431B's restriction. The court
relied on Malcolm v. State, 314
Md. 221, 550 A.2d 670 (1988), in
finding that § 6431B's restriction on
parole eligibility and sentence sus-
pension is only applicable to the
first twenty-five years of a repeat
offender's sentence. Malcolm in-
volved a habitual offender sentenc-
ing statute which set a minimum
ten year sentence for repeat drug
offenders. Taylor, 333 Md. at
235,634 A.2dat 1325. The statute
in Malcolm mirrored the statute in
Taylor because no parole or sus-
pension of the sentence could be
imposed for the minimum sentenc-
ing period. Id. TheMalcolm court
found the language of the sentenc-
ing statute ambiguous and con-
strued it in favor of the defendant
by finding that only the first ten of
the twenty years of the sentence
were restricted. Id.
In Taylor, the court found §
643B to be similarly ambiguous
and applied the canons of statu-
tory construction to interpret its
application. Id. at 235-36, 634
A.2d at 1325. The court acknowl-
edged that the purposes of penalty
enhancement statutes are to pro-
tect the public and deter crime. Id.,
citing State v. Taylor, 329 Md.
671,621 A.2d 424 (1993). Never-
theless because of the ambiguity,
the court adopted a lenient reading
of § 643B and permitted the trial
court to use discretion in allowing
parole and suspension of the sen-
tence after the first twenty-five
years of imprisonment. Taylor,
333 Md. at 236, 634 A.2dat 1325.
Accordingly, Taylor's sentence
was vacated and the case was re-
manded for resentencing. Id. at
237-38, 634 A.2d at 1326.
A dissent by Judge Bell, in
which Judge Chasanow joined, re-
jected the majority's decision to
overturnLeggett and suggestedthat
the majority had improperly sub-
stituted its judgment for that of the
legislature by creating an ambigu-
ity in the language of§ 643B which
did not exist. Taylor, 333 Md. at
242-44, 634 A.2d at 1328-29. The
dissenting opinion reviewed both
the rules of statutory construction
and the language of § 643B, and
unlike the majority, found § 643B
to be unambiguous. Id. at 238-39,
634 A.2d at 1326-27. Accord-
ingly, the dissent reiterated that §
643B must be interpreted accord-
ing to its plain language. Id. The
dissent found that the crystal clear
language of § 643B mandated that
athird time recidivist offender con-
victed of first degree murder be
sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole or
suspension of the sentence. Id at
239-42, 634 A.2d at 1327-1328.
In so finding, the dissent distin-
guished the Malcolm decision re-
lied upon by the majority and reaf-
firmed its support for the Leggett
decision. Id. at 243, 634 A.2d at
1329.
In Taylor v. State, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that the
restriction on sentence suspension
and parole eligibility under the three
times recidivist statute, § 643B, is
only applicable to the first twenty-
five years of a life imprisonment
sentence. In so holding, the court
declined to follow rigid legislative
sentencing guidelines, and instead,
granted trial courts broad discre-
tion in imposing enhanced sentences
on repeat offenders. In effect, the
court has granted the judiciary leg-
islative power to create sentencing
guidelines on a case-by-case basis.
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